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Abstract
This paper investigates the optimal (eﬀort-maximizing) structure of multi-stage sequential-
elimination contests with pooling competition in each stage. We allow the contest organizer
to design the contest structure in two arms: contest sequence (the number of stages, and the
number of remaining contestants in each stage), and prize allocation. First, we find that the
optimality of “winner-take-all” (single final winner, single final prize, no intermediate prizes)
is independent of the contest sequence. Second, we show that the more complete the contest
sequence is, the more eﬀorts can be induced from the contestants. Therefore, the optimal
contest eliminates one contestant at each stage until the finale, while a single winner takes over
the entire prize purse. Our results not only rationalize various forms of multi-stage contests
conducted in reality, such as the well-known Fox TV show “American Idol”, but also shed light
on the design of internal organizational hierarchy.
JEL Nos: C7, D7
1 Introduction
Situations in which economic agents expend costly and non-refundable resources in order
to win a limited number of prizes are fairly ubiquitous. For instance, high school students
engage in academic eﬀorts to compete for college admissions. Firms participate in research
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tournament to win a procurement contract of innovation. Cities lobby the International
Olympic Committee in order to host Olympic Games. In modeling contests, the economic
literature conventionally assumes that the contest lasts for only one stage, in which each
contestant competes against all others for a single prize (“winner-take-all”). Many contests
in reality, however, last for more than one stages, and require contestants to repeatedly
exert eﬀorts. In the final stage, the finalists expend resources to compete for the prizes;
while in each preliminary stage, the remaining contestants compete for the “tickets” to the
next round. In most of the contexts, no prize other than the “tickets” is awarded in the
preliminary stages.
Numerous real world contest settings exhibit such a multi-phase sequential competition
structure. One such example is the “election of London” to host the 2012 summer Olympic
Game. While 9 cities initially submit applications, only 5 of them (London, Madrid, Moscow,
NewYork and Paris) are shortlisted as the candidates for the final election. The 2005 DARPA
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) Grand Challenge, a race among autonomous
robots held in the Mojave Desert along a route of 132.2 miles, also exemplifies a sequential
competition setting. A total of 43 teams were selected out of 195 applicants to participate
in the NQE (National Qualification Event), which cut the 43 teams down to 23 for the final
race. In the end, “Stanley”, the Stanford Racing Team’s autonomous robotic car, completed
the course first and earned a $2 million prize.1 In research tournaments, the procurement
firms select the few most attractive ideas from a larger pool of innovation proposals, and only
the selected are eligible for the further race towards successful innovation (see Fullerton and
McAfee, 1999). In many Asian countries, in contrast to the K-12 system in U.S., students
have to take more than one major screening exams in order to be admitted into colleges. In
recruiting new faculty members, economics departments usually interview a large group of
candidates, but extend on-campus visit invitations to only a small number of them.
Central to the contest literature is the inquiry how the design or the rule of the contest
aﬀects the total eﬀorts contestants expend. As argued by Gradstein and Konrad (1999),
“. . . the contest structures are the outcome of a careful design with the view of attaining a
variety of objectives, one of which is maximization of eﬀorts by contenders”. The eﬀorts of
the contestants benefit the contest organizer in many occasions, such as professional sports,
1We thank Ivan Png for alerting us of this example.
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research tournament, as well as political rent-seeking. Following this thread of thinking,
our paper addresses the issue of optimal (eﬀort-maximizing) contest design in a multi-phase
sequential Tullock contest setting with pooling competition in each stage. We recognize that
the structure of a multi-stage contest consists of two aspects: the sequence (the number
of stages, and the number of remaining contestants in each stage), and the allocation
of prizes. Specifically, we answer the following questions. First, given the sequence of
a multi-stage contest, and a fixed total of prize purses, how does the contest organizer
allocate the prize mass to the recipients in order to maximize the eﬀorts? Does a “winner-
take-all” (single-winner and single-prize) contest necessarily dominate a contest that awards
intermediate prizes? Second, given the number of participants and the total value of prizes,
does a multi-stage contest, which sequentially eliminates contestants, drive more eﬀorts, as
compared to a single-stage simultaneous contest? What is the optimal contest sequence?
Third, does the sequence of the contest intertwine with the prize allocation in influencing
the eﬀorts?
We investigate the optimal contest sequence and the optimal prize allocation in a unified
framework. We consider a multi-stage contest, in which N identical contestants compete for
a fixed prize mass, instead of a given single prize. Each stage-contest is a pooling contest,
in which each remaining contestant competes against all other remaining contestants. In
each preliminary stage, a contestant competes not only for the “tickets” to the next stage,
but also for nonnegative intermediate prizes. In the final stage, the remaining contestants
compete for nonnegative final prizes only. We allow the contest organizer to maximize the
total eﬀorts in two arms: choosing the optimal contest sequence and allocating optimally
the prize mass. We first show that the optimal allocation of the prize mass is independent of
the contest sequence structure, and a “winner-take-all” (single-prize) contest dominates all
other prize allocations. We then show that the more “complete” the contest sequence is, the
more eﬀorts the contestants expend.2 As a consequence, the optimal contest that maximizes
the total eﬀorts is a (N − 1)-stage “Pyramid” contest that eliminates one contestant at each
stage, and a single final winner takes over the entire prize purse. To summarize, our study
provides rationales for (i) the multi-stage contest widely observed in reality; and (ii) the
winner-take-all principle commonly assumed in modeling rent-seeking competition in a more
2We will define the concept of completeness in Section 3.3.
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general setting.
The Relation to the Literature
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993) raise the question “why do politicians frequently ‘an-
nounce’ that they have narrowed down a set of potential recipients of a ‘prize’ to a slate of
finalists?” They examine the scenario, in which the politician optimally shortlists a set of fi-
nalists from a pool of rent seekers (who diﬀer in their valuations for the final prize) to induce
more competition, while the process of shortlisting does not involve rent-seeking activities
on the part of contestants. A handful of papers, in contrast, have modeled the process of
shortlisting as the preliminary stages of a sequential contest, which requires contestants to
repeatedly expend eﬀorts. For instance, Amegashie (1999) considers a two-stage contest. In
the first stage of the contest, contestants are divided into groups, and a single winner stands
out from each group to participate in the second-stage (final) competition.
Rosen (1986) models the organizational hierarchy as a series of pairwise contests: em-
ployees compete for promotion along the ladder of hierarchy. He shows that a larger top
prize increases the overall eﬀorts. Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005), as well as Matros (2005),
consider two-stage tournament contests that group contestants in preliminary stages. In
contrast to Amegashie (1999), they study the optimal intertemporal eﬀort allocation of the
contestants faced with resource constraints. Gradstein (1998) also contributes to this re-
search agenda by comparing a simultaneous contest with a contest that consists of a series
of pairwise subcontests.
Rosen (1986) considers a 2N−contestant N−stage sequential contest: in each stage, two
of the remaining contestants are matched into head-to-head confrontation, and the winner
survives for the next stage. Yet he does not justify the optimality of the contest structure. In
the sense of endogenizing the contest structure, our paper is more closely related to Gradstein
and Konrad (1999), as well as Moldovanu and Sela (2006). Gradstein and Konrad (1999)
consider multi-stage imperfectly discriminatory contests that group identical contestants
in preliminary stages. In contrast to Rosen (1986) and Amegashie (1999), they allow the
contest organizer to flexibly design the contest structure as a matching scheme. They show
that the multi-stage contest adopted by Rosen (1986) may emerge as the optimum if the
contest success function is less discriminatory. In a perfectly discriminatory contest setting,
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Moldovanu and Sela (2006) study the optimal contest architecture that specifies whether
and how the contestants should be split into subgroups in the first-stage competition. They
find that the optimality of contest architecture depends upon the properties of contestants’
cost function, as well as the objective of the contest organizer. A single grand static contest
maximizes the expected total eﬀorts for the case of linear cost of eﬀort. If the eﬀort cost
function is convex, a designer can benefit from splitting the contestants into several subgroups
in the preliminary stage of the contest.
Our paper diﬀers from these papers in two regards. Firstly, we allow remaining con-
testants to compete against “all others” in each stage, instead of matching them into diﬀer-
ent groups. We consider each stage of competition in the sequential elimination process as a
multiple-winner multiple-loser contest (as first suggested by the seminal paper of Clark and
Riis (1996)): the winners are first selected to proceed to the next stage, while the rest of
contestants are eliminated.3 Amegashie (2000) compares the two following ways of “short-
listing” in two-stage contests: pooling (contestants compete against all others in each stage)
and grouping (contestants are divided into groups). He shows that the former generates a
higher rent-dissipation rate. Fu and Lu (2005) also provide theoretical evidence supporting
that pooling competition generates higher rent-dissipation rate. These studies partially jus-
tify why we adopt a pooling competition in each stage of the game. Our paper is also related
to Fullerton and McAfee (1999) in modeling “shortlisting”. In a two-stage model, they show
that the optimal research tournament requires competing companies to participate in an
all-pay auction (as a screening scheme) to win the entry, while only a subset of firms (the
most competitive firms) engage in innovation activities.
Secondly, few of these papers allow for flexible prize allocation in multi-stage contest
settings. Most of papers in the contest literature assume that the prize structure is ex-
ogenously given, and is governed by the “winner-take-all” principle: a single final winner
receives a single indivisible prize. Besides Rosen (1986), the exceptions are Krishna and
Morgan (1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Matros (2005). Krishna and Morgan (1998)
justify the winner-take-all principle in small tournaments. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) con-
3Clark and Riis (1998) suggest an interesting multi-stage contest with a diﬀerent rule. In their paper,
winners are first selected in each stage to receive the stage prizes, but then they have to exit from the contest;
while the losers proceed to the next stage and continue to exert eﬀorts in order to compete for the remaining
prizes.
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sider the optimal prize allocation in a one-stage perfectly discriminatory contest (all-pay
auction). Matros (2005) allows the contest organizer to flexibly allocate his/her budget be-
tween a single winner’s prize and losers’ rewards to maximize the total eﬀorts in a two-stage
contest, and shows that a winner-take-all contest dominates.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In Section 3, we first derive
the general solution of equilibrium eﬀorts in a multi-stage multi-prize contest. We then
present our results on the optimal contest structure. In addition, we discuss the implications
and applications of these results. Section 4 provides a concluding remark.
2 The Model
N(≥ 3) risk-neutral contestants are engaged in a multi-stage sequential contest with non-
negative intermediate and final prizes. The contest organizer has a total budget of Γ0 for
prize allocation. For this moment, we fix the sequence of the contest, i.e. the number of
stages and the numbers of survivors in each stage. Let L denote the number of stages in
the contest, and Nl denote the number of contestants in stage l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}. In stage
l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1}, Nl contestants participate, and Nl+1 of them survive and proceed to
the next stage. Clearly, we have N1 ≡ N . There are Nl nonnegative intermediate prizes
Wml ,m ∈ {1, . . . , Nl}, available for each stage l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L−1}. At stage L, NL contestants
compete for NL nonnegative final prizes WmL ,m ∈ {1, . . . , NL}.4 The sequence of a given
contest is therefore represented by a L-term non-increasing sequence {N1,N2,..., NL}. Clearly,
we should have N1 = N ≥ N2 ≥ ... ≥ NL ≥ 1.
At all stages l = 1, 2, ..., L, the remaining contestants simultaneously exert their nonneg-
ative eﬀorts eil, i = 1, 2, ..., Nl. The tickets to the next stage and the stage prizes are allocated
in a sequential lottery process as modeled by Clark and Riis (1996). Once a contestant is
selected, he/she is immediately removed from the pool, while the rest of them are eligible for
the next draw. Define Ωml to be the set of remaining contestants up for the m−th draw in
stage l, where m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nl}. Denote (e1l , ..., ei−1l , ei+1l , ..., eNll ) by e−il . The conditional
probability that a contestant i ∈ Ωml is selected in the m−th draw is then given by
4Some final prizes are allowed to be zero.
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p(eil, e
−i
l ;Ω
m
l ) = e
i
lÁ
X
j∈Ωml
ejl . (1)
In the case that all contestants up for a draw make zero eﬀort, we assume that the
selected is randomly chosen from the pool. Moreover, we assume that if Ωml reduces to a
singleton, then the only contestant is automatically selected for sure regardless of his eﬀort.
At stage l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, the contestant selected in them−th draw is awarded the prizeWml .
In addition, at stage l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1}, the contestants who are selected in the first Nl+1
draws proceed to the (l+1)−th stage, while the other Nl−Nl+1 contestants are eliminated.
We define Γl ≡
NlX
m=1
Wml to be the sum of prizes awarded in stage l, and Γ ≡
LX
l=1
Γl to be
the total of the prizes in the whole contest.
Denote by Vl the conditional (symmetric) equilibrium expected payoﬀ of a representative
contestant at stage l. For convenience, we define VL+1 = 0. At stage l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L},
a representative contestant i rationally chooses his/her eﬀort eil to maximize his expected
payoﬀ
V il =
Nl+1X
m=1
[Pm(eil, e
−i
l )(Vl+1 +W
m
l )] +
NlX
m=Nl+1+1
[Pm(eil, e
−i
l )W
m
l ]− eil, (2)
where Pm(eil, e
−i
l ) is the probability that contestant i is selected in them−th draw. Note that
Pm(eil, e
−i
l ) =
X
∀Ωml
[Pr(Ωml ) Pr(i ∈ Ωml )p(eil, e−il ;Ωml )], where Pr(Ωml ) is the probability that the
remaining contestants up for the m-th draw are Ωml , and Pr(i ∈ Ωml ) is the probability that
contestant i belongs to Ωml . Since we consider the symmetric equilibrium, we assume all
contestants other than i exert the same eﬀort e0l without loss of generality. Under this
simplification,
Pm(eil, e
−i
l ) =
(Nl − 1)!
(Nl −m)!
(Πm−1k=1
e0l
eil + (Nl − k)e0l
)
eil
eil + (Nl −m)e0l
. (3)
Denote by el the symmetric equilibrium eﬀort. From (3), when eil = el, i = 1, ..., Nl,
∂Pm(eil ,e
−i
l )
∂eil
is given by
∂Pm(el, ..., el)
∂eil
=
(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g )
Nlel
. (4)
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The first order condition for the interior equilibrium eﬀort el is thus
Nl+1X
m=1
[
∂Pm(el, ..., el)
∂eil
(Vl+1 +Wml )] +
NlX
m=Nl+1+1
[
∂Pm(el, ..., el)
∂eil
Wml ]− 1 = 0. (5)
(4) and (5) lead to
Nl+1X
m=1
[(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl − g
)(Vl+1 +Wml )] +
NlX
m=Nl+1+1
[(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl − g
)Wml ]−Nlel = 0. (6)
Proposition 1 In a symmetric interior equilibrium of the contest in stage l, each remaining
contestant exerts an eﬀort of
el =
PNl+1
m=1 [(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g )(Vl+1 +W
m
l )] +
NlX
m=Nl+1+1
[(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g )W
m
l ]
Nl
. (7)
Proposition 1, which directly stems from the first order condition (6), gives the interior
equilibrium individual eﬀort of each remaining contestant in stage l. It strictly increases
with the expected future payoﬀ Vl+1 as the coeﬃcient of Vl+1 is
PNl+1
m=1(1 −
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g ) =
Nl+1 −
PNl+1−1
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g ≥ 0. Note that the term
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g strictly increases with m, the
index for the order of the draw. Thus, the equilibrium eﬀort el also increases with the
value of “earlier” prizes Wml (the prizes awarded with earlier draws), where m satisfies
1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g > 0. However, el decreases with the values of later prizesW
m
l , where m satisfies
1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g < 0.
Define Φl to be Φl ≡
PNl+1
m=1 [(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g )(Vl+1+W
m
l )]+
NlX
m=Nl+1+1
[(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g )W
m
l ]. The
solution for the symmetric equilibrium eﬀort is valid and satisfies (6) if and only if Φl ≥ 0
holds for {Wml }Nlm=1. Otherwise a corner solution applies and the equilibrium eﬀort would be
zero. Φl < 0 may happen when suﬃciently large prizes are awarded for the latest draws. In
this case, the contestants prefer not to make positive eﬀort, but to wait for the latest prizes.
As a result, the first order condition for interior solution fails, and the corner solution of
zero eﬀort arises. Here and hereafter, we assume Φl ≥ 0, and restrict our attention to the
(unique) symmetric interior equilibrium. In Section 3.2, we will show in detail that there is
no loss of generality to focus only on the prize allocations that lead to interior equilibrium.
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Rearrange the terms in (6), we have
Nlel = Nl+1Vl+1 − Vl+1
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1 − g
Nl − g
+ Γl −
NlX
m=1
(Wml
mX
k=1
1
Nl − k + 1
). (8)
Define the total eﬀorts E ≡
LX
l=1
Nlel. In this context, we assume that the total eﬀorts
accrue to the benefit of the contest organizer. Thus, the contest organizer is to choose the
optimal sequences {Nl}Ll=1 and prize allocation {Wml |m = 1, ..., Nl; l = 1, ..., L} to maximize
the total eﬀorts E, subject to the budget constraint
Γ ≤ Γ0. (9)
3 Results
3.1 Preliminary Results
For convenience, we define ΓL+1 = 0. In a stage l, ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, every symmetric contes-
tant has the same chance of winning each component of the total stage-award Nl+1Vl+1+Γl
(including Nl stage prizes and Nl+1 tickets to the next stage) in a symmetric equilibrium.
Therefore, the conditional equilibrium expected payoﬀ of a representative contestant at stage
l is Vl = (Nl+1Vl+1 + Γl)/Nl − el, where el is his/her equilibrium eﬀort at stage l. The total
of the Nl contestants’ equilibrium expected payoﬀs can then be written as
NlVl = Nl+1Vl+1 + Γl −Nlel, (10)
which implies
Nlel = Nl+1Vl+1 + Γl −NlVl. (11)
Lemma 1 E = Γ−NV1.
Proof. Summing up (11) over the L stages gives
E ≡
L−1X
l=1
Nlel +NLeL
=
L−1X
l=1
(Nl+1Vl+1 −NlVl) +
L−1X
l=1
Γl +NLeL
= NLVL −NV1 +
L−1X
l=1
Γl +NLeL. (12)
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Note that in the last stage of the contest, i.e. stage L, we have NLVL = ΓL − NLeL.
Thus,
E = ΓL −NV1 +
L−1X
l=1
Γl
= Γ−NV1. (13)
Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 is fairly intuitive. V1 represents the conditional expected payoﬀ a representative
contestant receives in the first stage. The contestant does not only gain from the intermediate
prizes awarded in this stage, but also from the values of the “tickets” to future stages. As
a consequence, V1 is the payoﬀ every contestant expects from the whole contest in the very
beginning of the contest. Thus, NV1 represents the total surplus all contestants receive in
the contest, which, by the risk neutrality of the contestants, is equivalent to the diﬀerence
between the total prize mass Γ and the total eﬀorts E.
From (8), the total equilibrium eﬀorts in each stage are determined by the conditional
expected payoﬀs of a representative contestant in next stage, and the stage prizes awarded
in the current stage. Using (8) and (11), we can write in the following Lemma contestants’
payoﬀs in the current stage (Vl) in terms of the future expected payoﬀ (Vl+1), and the
intermediate prizes of the current stage prizes.
Lemma 2 NlVl = Vl+1
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g +
NlX
m=1
(Wml
mX
k=1
1
Nl−k+1), for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}.
Using Lemma 2, we are able to recursively solve for V1 as in Lemma 3, which states that
V1 can be written as a function of the prizes in the current and all future stages.
Lemma 3 V1 =
LX
l=1
{( Πlj=1 1Nj )(Πl−1j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1−g
Nj−g )
NlX
m=1
(Wml
mX
k=1
1
Nl−k+1)}.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 3, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 A N-person L-stage sequential-elimination contest, with the sequence struc-
ture {Nl}Ll=1, prize allocation {Wml |m = 1, ..., Nl; l = 1, ..., L} and a total prize purse Γ,
induces the total equilibrium eﬀorts of
E = Γ−N
LX
l=1
{(Πlj=1
1
Nj
)(Πl−1j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1 − g
Nj − g
)
NlX
m=1
(Wml
mX
k=1
1
Nl − k + 1
)}. (14)
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3.2 The Optimal Prize Allocation
Lemma 3 shows that given the sequence of the contest, a contestant’s equilibrium surplus
V1 completely depends on the allocation of the prize purses. If the contest organizer intends
to maximize the total eﬀorts E, how many final winners should be allowed for? Does it pay
to create intermediate prizes that are awarded in earlier stages? Next, we address how the
contest organizer optimally allocates his/her total budget Γ0 over the
LX
l=1
Nl possible prizes.
By Lemma 1, the optimal prize allocation that maximizes the total eﬀorts must minimize the
equilibrium surplus V1. Thus, we can focus on the minimization of V1 to solve the original
eﬀort-maximization problem.
Before we proceed, we first clarify why there is no loss of generality if we focus on prize
allocations that lead to symmetric interior equilibrium. Recall (6). An interior equilibrium
requires Φl ≡
PNl+1
m=1 [(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g )(Vl+1+W
m
l )]+
NlX
m=Nl+1+1
[(1−
m−1P
g=0
1
Nl−g )W
m
l ] ≥ 0. Suppose
that the prize allocation makes Φl < 0, which leads to the corner solution, i.e. el = 0. First,
note that if we allocate the entire Γl to the first draw prize, it must follow that Φl ≥ 0.
Second, Φl is continuous in {Wml }Nlm=1. Thus, the contest organizer can always shift the prize
mass Γl from later prizes to earlier prizes within the stage, and reach an allocation that
delivers exactly Φl = 0. The first order condition (6) is then reinstated and it renders an
interior equilibrium with el = 0. Thus, by appropriately shifting the prize mass from later
prizes to earlier prizes, we can always apply condition (6) and obtain an interior equilibrium,
which generates the same outcome as the corner solution equilibrium. Note from (10) that
this adjustment of prizes does not alter Vl as well. As a result, it does not aﬀect the total
eﬀorts in any other stage of the contest. This means that we can ignore the possibility of a
corner solution, and assume Φl to be nonnegative without loss of generality.
Theorem 1 (“Winner-take-all”) Given a contest sequence {Nl}Ll=1, the optimal contest
prize allocation that maximizes the total eﬀorts E requires the entire prize purse to be allo-
cated to the first prize in the final stage, i.e. W 1L = Γ0.
Proof. The proof consists of three steps.
Define for brevityDl ≡ ( Πlj=1 1Nj )(Π
l−1
j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1−g
Nj−g )
NlX
m=1
(Wml
mX
k=1
1
Nl−k+1). From Lemma
11
3, we can then write V1 as the sum of the L separate terms Dl, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, i.e.,
V1 =
LX
l=1
Dl. (15)
Step One: Wml = 0, if m > 1, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}.
For any fixed Γl, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, Dl is minimized if the entire prize purse in stage l is
allocated to the first prize W 1l because
mX
k=1
1
Nl−k+1 increases with m. Thus for the optimal
prize allocation, we must have Wml = 0, if m > 1, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}.
Step Two: W 1l = 0, for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L−1}, and W 1L = Γ, given a fixed total prize
purse Γ ≤ Γ0.
Step one implies that V1 can be reduced to the following form for the optimal prize
allocation
V1 =
LX
l=1
{( Πlj=1
1
Nj
)(Πl−1j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1 − g
Nj − g
)
W 1l
Nl
}. (16)
Next, we show that for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L−1}, if we move the prize massW 1l toW 1l+1, it further
reduces V1. For this purpose, we need only to compare the coeﬃcients ofW 1l andW
1
l+1. Thus,
we compare (Πlj=1
1
Nj
)(Πl−1j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1−g
Nj−g )
1
Nl
with ( Πl+1j=1
1
Nj
)(Πlj=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1−g
Nj−g )
1
Nl+1
. Ignor-
ing the common elements, we only need to compare 1Nl to (
1
Nl+1
)2
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g . Obviously,(
1
Nl+1
)2
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g < (
1
Nl+1
)2(Nl+1
Nl+1
Nl
) = 1Nl , because,
Nl+1−g
Nl−g <
Nl+1
Nl
if g > 0. It follows that the
weight on W 1l is strictly greater than that on W
1
l+1, which implies that shifting the mass of
W 1l to W
1
l+1 strictly reduces V1.
Thus in order to minimize V1, all prize mass allocated to prizes in an earlier stage (l < L)
should be reallocated to W 1L. Given the total amount of prizes Γ, we thus have W 1L = Γ.
Thus, we show that a “winner-take-all” contest maximizes the total eﬀorts for any given
contest sequence.
Step Three: Γ = Γ0, i.e., the contest organizer uses up the entire budget on
prizes.
Based on steps one and two, Proposition 2 leads to that E can be reduced to the following
form for the optimal prize allocation
E = Γ[1−N( ΠLj=1
1
Nj
)(ΠL−1j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1 − g
Nj − g
)
1
NL
]. (17)
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Note thatN(ΠLj=1
1
Nj
)(ΠL−1j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1−g
Nj−g )
1
NL
= NN2L
ΠL−1j=1 [
1
Nj
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1−g
Nj−g ] <
N
N2L
ΠL−1j=1
Nj+1
Nj
=
1
NL
≤ 1. Thus E strictly increases with Γ. Therefore, the entire budget Γ0 should be allocated
to W 1L.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 establishes that if the contestant organizer has the flexibility to allocate a
fixed prize mass, a multi-stage contest that maximizes the total eﬀorts must combine all
the resource into a single final prize and reward it to a single final winner, regardless of the
sequence of the contest. Our results therefore provide a rationale for the commonly assumed
“winner-take-all” principle in modeling rent-seeking competition. Clark and Riis (1996) show
that contestants expend more eﬀorts if the contest is governed by a “winner-take-all” rule
than they do if the number of positive prizes exceeds one. Theorem 1 confirms this insight
in the context of multi-stage elimination contests.
Lemma 3 shows that V1 is a weighted sum of the prizes awarded in all stages. The weights
on prizes exhibit two interesting features. On one hand, within a single stage, an earlier
prize has a smaller weight. This is due to the fact that a higher probability of winning an
earlier prize demands higher eﬀorts from a contestant. As a result, within a stage l, the
contest organizer can increase the eﬀorts by allocating the entire stage purse Γl to the first-
draw prize, i.e. W 1l = Γl.
5 Therefore, we can focus on the contest structure that allocates
the prize purse only to the first-draw prize of each stage. On the other hand, between any
two stages, a first-draw prize awarded in a later stage has a smaller weight. The intuition is
that contestants have to (repeatedly) exert their further eﬀorts to win a prize awarded in a
later stage. In other words, a prize at a higher rank of the ladder demands more eﬀorts from
a contestant. To induce the highest subsequent eﬀorts, all resources should then be allocated
as one single prize at the last stage. Aggregating both the “within” and “between” eﬀects
leads to the optimality of “winner-take-all” in our multi-stage setting.
3.3 The Optimal Contest Sequence: Pyramid Contest
Having established the “winner-take-all” principle as the optimal prize allocation rule in
any multi-stage contest, it remains to ask what is the optimal sequence of the contest (the
number of stages and the number of remaining contestants in each stage). Next, we study
5This eﬀect is consistent with the “winner-take-all” principle in Moldovanu and Sela (2001).
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how the contest organizer optimally chooses the sequence {Nl}Ll=1 to maximize the total
eﬀorts E. By Theorem 1, the allocation of prize mass is independent of the sequence of the
contest, we therefore simply restrict our attention to the case with a single prize W 1L = Γ0.
Rewriting Lemma 3 by setting all prizes other than W 1L to be zero leads to
V1 = ( ΠLj=1
1
Nj
)(ΠL−1j=1
Nj+1−1P
g=0
Nj+1 − g
Nj − g
)
Γ0
NL
. (18)
First of all, for mathematical convenience, we consider only the contest sequences with
NL = 1 for the optimal sequence without loss of generality. By the optimality of “winner-
take-all” principle in prize allocation, a single winner survives the last stage of the contest
and takes over the entire prize purse. Thus, a L−stage contest with NL > 1 is equivalent to a
hypothetical (L+1)−stage contest represented by the sequence {{Nl}Ll=1, 1}, i.e. NL+1 = 1.
In the hypothetical (L+1)−stage contest, one contestant is selected at stage L to enter stage
L+1, but does not receive prize in stage L. But the “last man standing” automatically wins
Γ0 in stage L+1 without exerting eﬀort. Consequently, we have eL+1 = 0 and VL = Γ0, and
equation (18) still applies. We thus consider in the following analysis only contest sequences
with NL = 1.
Second, we assume that the contest sequence {Nl}Ll=1 is strictly decreasing. Equation
(16) implies that if Nl = Nl+1, then eliminating stage l does not aﬀect V1. Based on the
above two results, we can search for the optimal contest sequence by considering only the
sequences {Nl}Ll=1, where N1 = N > N2 > ... > NL = 1, without loss of generality.
In a L−stage contest with a sequence of {Nl}Ll=1 where NL = 1, suppose there exists
J < L such that NJ − NJ+1 > 1. We imagine to insert an additional stage between stage
J and stage J + 1, in which M ∈ {NJ+1 + 1, ..., NJ − 1} contestants selected from the NJ
contestants at the J-th stage compete for the NJ+1 tickets to stage J + 1. Does adding this
additional stage necessarily induce more total eﬀorts from the contestants?
The eﬀect of this additional stage on the total eﬀorts in the contest is not readily seen:
although the additional stage M creates a new source of eﬀorts MeM , the impact of this
additional stage on the contestants’ eﬀort entries in previous stages is ambiguous. First,
from (8), NJeJ may either decrease or increase, although NJeJ tends to be reduced as the
value of the ticket to the next stage is lower (VM = (NJ+1VJ+1−MeM)/M < VJ+1). This is
due to the fact that in (8), NJeJ is not a monotonic function of the number of survivors to
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the next stage.6 For the same reason, the impact of the additional stage on the stage payoﬀ
VJ is also indefinite. Second, the additional stage’s impact on the eﬀorts in stages prior to
stage J , Njej, j < J, is also ambiguous. From (8), Njej, j < J , would change in the same
direction as Vj+1, which in turn changes in the same direction as VJ .
Let E({Nl}) denote the set composed of all the integers in the sequence {Nl}.
Definition 1 A contest sequence {N˜l} is more complete than {Nl} if and only if E({Nl}) ⊂
E({N˜l}).
We show in the following theorem that any additional stage always increases the total
eﬀorts, regardless of the existing contest structure.
Theorem 2 The more complete the contest sequence is, the higher the total eﬀorts are
induced.
Proof. Denote by E0 the total eﬀorts in the original contest {Nl}, while by EM the total
eﬀorts in the new contest after one additional stage M is inserted. We only need to show
EM > E0.
Denote by eV1 the equilibrium expected payoﬀ that the N contestants anticipate at the
first stage of the contest after the additional stage is inserted. By Lemma 1, we simply need
to show eV1 < V1.
Under the optimal prize allocation characterized in Theorem 1, Lemma 2 leads to that
V1 =
VJ+1
JQ
l=1
Nl
·
JQ
l=1
(
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1 − g
Nl − g
). (19)
Similarly,
eV1 = VJ+1
M
JQ
l=1
Nl
· [
J−1Q
l=1
(
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1 − g
Nl − g
)](
M−1P
g=0
M − g
NJ − g
)(
NJ+1−1P
g=0
NJ+1 − g
M − g ). (20)
6The following example shows that the component Nl+1 −
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g is not a monotonic function of
Nl+1. Assume Nl = 5. Then Nl+1−
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g = 1.35 when Nl+1 = 2;Nl+1−
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g = 1.57 when
Nl+1 = 3;Nl+1 −
Nl+1−1P
g=0
Nl+1−g
Nl−g = 1.28 when Nl+1 = 4.
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To establish that eV1 < V1, we need to show 1M (NJ+1−1P
g=0
NJ+1−g
M−g )(
M−1P
g=0
M−g
NJ−g ) <
NJ+1−1P
g=0
NJ+1−g
NJ−g .
Since M−gNJ−g is decreasing in g,
M−1P
g=0
M−g
NJ−g
M <
NJ+1−1P
g=0
M−g
NJ−g
NJ+1
. Thus,
1
M
(
NJ+1−1P
g=0
NJ+1 − g
M − g )(
M−1P
g=0
M − g
NJ − g
)
<
1
NJ+1
(
NJ+1−1P
g=0
NJ+1 − g
M − g )(
NJ+1−1P
g=0
M − g
NJ − g
)
<
NJ+1−1P
g=0
NJ+1 − g
NJ − g
. (21)
The last step follows Chebyshev Sum Inequality.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 is important. It establishes that an additional stage of competition always
reduces a representative contestant’s expected payoﬀ V1, so as to increase the total eﬀorts.
A contest sequence is not optimal, as long as the diﬀerence between any two successive
terms in the sequence {Nl}Ll=1 exceeds one. The total eﬀorts of the contest can be increased
if additional stages can be inserted, regardless of its existing structure. Thus, the opti-
mal contest sequence is represented by a N−term strictly decreasing arithmetic sequence
{Nl|Nl = N − l + 1, l = 1, 2, ..., N.}. The last term NN = 1 represents the unique final
winner. In other words, the contest lasts for N − 1 stage, and one contestant is eliminated
in each stage.7 We name it as a complete-sequence “Pyramid” contest.
Theorem 3 In a setting with N contestants and a prize budget Γ0, the eﬀort-maximizing
sequential contest with pooling competition in each stage lasts for N − 1 stages, while elimi-
nating one contestant each stage, and a single final winner takes over the entire prize purse
of Γ0.
Theorem 3 naturally stems from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Thus, we conclude that
the optimal contest must be organized as a “winner-take-all” complete-sequence “Pyramid”
contest.
Theorem 4 The optimally designed N-person contest with the total prize purse of Γ0, i.e.
7In stage N − 1, two remaining contestants compete for one final prize.
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the “winner-take-all” “Pyramid” contest, induces a total equilibrium eﬀort of
E = Γ0 · {1−
N−1Q
l=1
[
N−l−1P
g=0
(N−l)−g
(N−l+1)−g ]
N−1Q
l=1
(N − l + 1)
}. (22)
Theorem 4 explicitly shows the equilibrium total eﬀorts in the optimally designed N-
person contest. The result directly arises from Lemma 1 and (18), and the fact that the
sequence structure of the optimal contest is represented by a complete sequence of integers
from N to 1.
3.4 Discussion
So far we have shown that a contest drives more eﬀorts, provided that the contestants
have to survive a longer line of shots before they win the final prize. Our results therefore
provide a rationale for the widely observed multi-phase sequential competition in reality.
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) argue that the contest organizer (politicians) may
strategically shortlist a subset of finalists, according to their valuations, to participate in
rent-seeking competitions (for instance, IOC selects potential candidate cities up for the
election of hosting cities of Olympic Games), in order to increase the rent-seeking revenue.
We suggest an alternative view to this thread of thinking: shortlisting benefits the contest
organizer even if the contestants are identical.
Our paper provides useful insights to contests design. We show that the optimal contest
that generates the most eﬀorts is a “winner-take-all” complete-sequence “Pyramid” contest.
The famous Fox TV show “American Idol” echoes our results pretty well. The show is
basically a singing contest. Twelve contestants are picked out from “thousands and thou-
sands of hopeful superstars”. These twelve “winners”, however, are not met with immediate
success. The remaining part of the contest proceeds exactly in the form of a “Pyramid”
contest which we have established to be optimal. The series of the shows then last for eleven
weeks. In each week every remaining contestant makes his/her performance. After each
show, one of the remaining contestants is voted oﬀ by viewers, while the others proceed to
the next stage. The procedure repeats until the finale, in which two survivors compete face
to face, and one of them becomes the new “American Idol”. We see that the organization
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structure of “American Idol” turns out to coincide with the eﬀort-maximizing contest we
have established.
Our results provide insights to contests design even when the organizer is faced with con-
straints on contest structure. For instance, a contest may have to be conducted with a fixed
number of stages, while the contest organizer has only the flexibility to choose the number
of contestants who survive each stage. Proposition 2 has fully characterized the maximal
total eﬀorts that result from any given contest sequence structure. The restricted optimal
contest sequence can thus be identified through direct comparison across finite possibilities.
Rosen (1986) and Gradstein and Konrad (1999) draw the analogy between the internal
hierarchy of an organization and a multi-stage contest. As argued by Gradstein and Kon-
rad (1999): “One can interpret the organization’s hierarchy in a steady state as consisting
of a series of contests among the individual members of each level of the hierarchy for the
promotion to an upper level.” Our results have two important implications on the design
of internal organizational structure. Firstly, we show, by Theorem 2, that a hierarchical
structure does increase the total eﬀorts agents expend inside the organization. This result
provides an alternative rationale for organizational hierarchy. Secondly, our results shed
light on the design of internal incentive (compensation) scheme. We show that in the op-
timal contest, the total of prize purses should be combined into a single final prize, and no
intermediate award should be given away. In the context of organizational hierarchy, the
winner-take-all principle may not be feasible. Yet our results do not lose its appeal in this
aspect. Recall Lemma 3, which gives a representative contestant’s expected payoﬀs in terms
of the prize structure. We see that V1 is in fact a weighted sum over the prizes, and the
weights associated with the prizes diminish as the level of the prizes ascends. It implies that
more generous purses for top-ranking prizes (wage, or other benefits) “maintain the incentive
in career” (Rosen (1986)) and increase the overall eﬀorts. Our results confirm the insights
suggested by Rosen (1986): “contestants who succeed in attaining high ranks in elimination
career ladders rest on their laurels in attempting to climb higher, unless top-ranking prizes
are given a disproportionate weight in the purse”.
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the optimal contest structure in a multi-phase sequential competition
setting. We allow the contest organizer to design the optimal contest in two arms: the
contest sequence and the allocation of a fixed total of prize purses. We show that the contest
organizer must allocate the entire prize mass to a single final prize, regardless of the contest
sequence. We further show that additional stages always increase the total eﬀorts. This result
provides important insights for the design of multi-stage contests. Therefore we conclude
that the optimal contest must be a “winner-take-all” complete-sequence “Pyramid” contest
that eliminates one contestant in each stage until the finale.
This paper concerns itself with one aspect of contests design: the maximization of total
eﬀorts, and leaves tremendous room for future extensions. First of all, we have not considered
the cost of organizing the contest. The contest organizer may be concerned about the
additional costs that could arise from additional stages, which should be taken into account
in future research on the optimal design of multi-stage contests. Secondly, we do not consider
the heterogeneity in abilities or preferences among contestants. One interesting extension is
to allow for contestants with diﬀering types. We believe that extensions in this direction will
not vary the main themes of our results. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to investigate
whether a stronger contestant is more likely to win the final prize in a multi-stage contest
than he/she does in a single-stage one. In that sense, a model with asymmetric players may
shed light on the screening eﬀect of the multi-stage contest. In addition, our study considers a
contest success function with linear impact of eﬀort. Perhaps, another challenging extension
would be to allow for other forms of contest technologies. Finally, our model assumes that
contestants’ eﬀorts aﬀect only the outcome of the sub-contest in the current stage. One may
extend this model by allowing for “accumulatable” eﬀorts, in which case eﬀorts made in the
current stage can be carried over into future stages and continue to influence contestants’
likelihoods of winning.
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